LANGSEC: Language-theoretic Security
"The View from the Tower of Babel"
The Second Language-theoretic Security (LangSec) IEEE S&P Workshop at the
IEEE Security & Privacy Symposium 2015 will take place in San Jose on May 21, 2015.
The First Language-theoretic Security (LangSec) IEEE S&P Workshop at the
Security & Privacy Symposium 2014 took place in San Jose, May 18, 2014
The Language-theoretic approach (LANGSEC) regards the Internet insecurity epidemic as a consequence of ad hoc programming of input handling at all layers of network stacks, and in other kinds of software stacks. LANGSEC posits that the only path to trustworthy software that takes untrusted inputs is treating all valid or expected inputs as a formal language, and the respective input-handling routines as a recognizer for that language. The recognition must be feasible, and the recognizer must match the language in required computation power.
When input handling is done in ad hoc way, the de facto recognizer, i.e. the input recognition and validation code ends up scattered throughout the program, does not match the programmers' assumptions about safety and validity of data, and thus provides ample opportunities for exploitation. Moreover, for complex input languages the problem of full recognition of valid or expected inputs may be UNDECIDABLE, in which case no amount of input-checking code or testing will suffice to secure the program. Many popular protocols and formats fell into this trap, the empirical fact with which security practitioners are all too familiar.
LANGSEC helps draw the boundary between protocols and API designs that can and cannot be secured and implemented securely, and charts a way to building truly trustworthy protocols and systems.
|LANGSEC in pictures: Occupy Babel!|
How to get on the LANGSEC mailing list: subscribe
|Articles and Papers||Talks|
Two high-level summary articles in December 2011 ;login:
Please link to this page as http://langsec.org/.