

# Building a Literate Parser and Proxy for DNP3

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# Outline

- Parsers, security, and the LangSec viewpoint
- Building a safer DNP3 parser from scratch
  - “Make the parser code look like the grammar”  
A.k.a. *Parser combinators* (using the Hammer kit from UpstandingHackers.com)
- Case study: a DNP3 filtering proxy
  - Validating (testing) our implementation
- Lessons learned / discussion



# LangSec

- Many security issues are **language recognition** issues  
exploit = accepting bad input, letting it act on program  
internals. What to accept? What is expected? What is valid?
- If security seems like an uphill battle...  
Just look at the syntax complexities. (there's a theory of it:  
Chomsky hierarchy of grammars)
- Some syntax is poison: (eg.: nested length, fields that must all  
agree; several sources of truth, ...)


# Languages vs recognizers



Languages



Acceptors



"Here be dragons"

"The Shire of validation"



# Solve language problems with a language approach

- Start with a grammar
  - If you don't know what valid or expected syntax/content of a message is, how can you check it? Or interoperate?
  - If the protocol comes without a grammar, you need to derive one. It sucks, but it's the only way.
- Write the parser to look like the grammar: succinct, *incrementally testable* (from the leaf nodes/primitives up)
- Don't start processing before you're done parsing



FULL RECOGNITION




BEFORE PROCESSING

*Nick L*

# DNP3 issues are not theoretical

- 2013 to 2014 – Over 30 CVEs related to input validation with DNP3 implementations.
- Out of dozens of implementations only a small few were defect-free.
- Low-defect implementations chose a conservative subset

# DNP3 Complex?



A  
H = Application Header


T  
H = Transport Header

L  
H = Link Header

# DNP3 Complex??

## 4.2.2.1 General fragment structure

Request and response fragments have similar, but slightly different, structures ([Figure 4-4](#)).



**Figure 4-4—Fragment structure**

Each fragment begins with an application header that contains message control information. This is true for all fragments regardless of whether they appear in single or multiple fragment messages.

# DNP3 Complex!?!

Table 14-4—Level 3 implementation (DNP3-L3)

DNP3 OBJECT GROUP & VARIATION			REQUEST Master may issue Outstation shall parse		RESPONSE Master shall parse Outstation may issue	
Group num	Var num	Description	Function codes (dec)	Qualifier codes (hex)	Function codes (dec)	Qualifier codes (hex)
1	0	Binary Input— Any Variation	1 (read) 22 (assign class)	00, 01 (start-stop) 06 (no range, or all)		
1	1	Binary Input— Packed format	1 (read)	00, 01 (start-stop) 06 (no range, or all)	129 (response)	00, 01 (start-stop)
1	2	Binary Input— With flags	1 (read)	00, 01 (start-stop) 06 (no range, or all)	129 (response)	00, 01 (start-stop)
2	0	Binary Input Event— Any Variation	1 (read)	06 (no range, or all) 07, 08 (limited qty)		
2	1	Binary Input Event— Without time	1 (read)	06 (no range, or all) 07, 08 (limited qty)	129 (response) 130 (unsol. resp)	17, 28 (index)
2	2	Binary Input Event— With absolute time	1 (read)	06 (no range, or all) 07, 08 (limited qty)	129 (response) 130 (unsol. resp)	17, 28 (index)
2	3	Binary Input Event— With relative time	1 (read)	06 (no range, or all) 07, 08 (limited qty)	129 (response) 130 (unsol. resp)	17, 28 (index)
10	0	Binary Output— Any Variation	1 (read)	00, 01 (start-stop) 06 (no range, or all)		
10	2	Binary Output— Output status with flags	1 (read)	00, 01 (start-stop) 06 (no range, or all)	129 (response)	00, 01 (start-stop)
12	1	Binary Command— Control relay output block (CROB)	3 (select) 4 (operate) 5 (direct op) 6 (dir. op, no ack)	17, 28 (index)	129 (response)	echo of request

GRP	VAR	Type	Description	Size
0 (0x00)	246 (0xF6)	Attribute	Device Attributes - User-assigned ID code/number	

Table 12-4—g3 double-bit binary input static objects

Group	Variation	Subset levels				Request (outstation must parse)		Response (master shall parse)	
		1	2	3	4	Function codes (decimal)	Qualifier codes (hexadecimal)	Function codes (decimal)	Qualifier codes (hexadecimal)
3	0	x	x	x		—	—		
3	0				✓	1 (READ)	00, 01, 06		
3	0				✓	22 (ASSIGN_CLASS)	00, 01, 06		
3	1	x	x	x		—	—	—	—
3	1				✓	1 (READ)	00, 01, 06	129 (RESPONSE)	00, 01
3	2	x	x	x		—	—	—	—
3	2				✓	1 (READ)	00, 01, 06	129 (RESPONSE)	00, 01

2 (0x02)	1 (0x01)	Event	Binary Input Event	1 octet
2 (0x02)	2 (0x02)	Event	Binary Input Event - with Absolute Time	7 octets
2 (0x02)	3 (0x03)	Event	Binary Input Event - with Relative Time	3 octets
3 (0x03)	0 (0x00)	Static	Double-bit Binary Input - Any Variations	
3 (0x03)	1 (0x01)	Static	Double-bit Binary Input - Packed Format	2 octets
3 (0x03)	2 (0x02)	Static	Double-bit Binary Input - Status with Flags	1 octet
4 (0x04)	0 (0x00)	Event	Double-bit Binary Input Event - Any Variations	
4 (0x04)	1 (0x01)	Event	Double-bit Binary Input Event	1 octet
4 (0x04)	2 (0x02)	Event	Double-bit Binary Input Event with Absolute Time	7 octets
4 (0x04)	3 (0x03)	Event	Double-bit Binary Input Event with Relative Time	3 octets
10 (0x0A)	0 (0x00)	Static	Binary Output - Any Variations	
10 (0x0A)	1 (0x01)	Static	Binary Output - Packed Format	1 bit
10 (0x0A)	2 (0x02)	Static	Binary Output - Status with Flags	1 octet
11 (0x0B)	0 (0x00)	Event	Binary Output Event - Any Variations	
11 (0x0B)	1 (0x01)	Event	Binary Output Event - Status	1 octet

### A.23.1.2.3 Notes

Read requests and responses shall use qualifier code 0x07. When an outstation receives this request, it implicitly indicates current time.

This object can be included in a write request. Write request value of 1 for this object. When an outstation receives the request, it wants to set the current time in the outstation.

# Syntax spills into semantics

```
// group 50 (times) ...  
g50v1_time_oblock = dnp3_p_single(G_V(TIME, TIME), time);
```

## Object group 50: time and date

### A.23.1.2.3 Notes

Read requests and responses shall use qualifier code 0x07 and a range field value of 1 for this object. When an outstation receives this request, it implicitly indicates that the master wants the outstation to return the current time.

This object can be included in a write request. Write requests shall use qualifier code 0x07 and a range field value of 1 for this object. When an outstation receives this request, it implicitly indicates that the master wants to set the current time in the outstation.

# Syntax spills ... where?

## Object group 51: common time-of-occurrence

An example of an object that depends on a Time and Date Common Time-of-Occurrence object is a binary input change event with relative time, object group 2, variation 3.

The following shows how multiple Time and Date CTO objects may be included in a response when there are not enough bits in a data object to hold the relative time with respect to a single Time and Date CTO object. Each data object's time is relative to the immediately preceding Time and Date CTO. In the figure, the time in  $DO_{i+1}$  is relative to  $T\&D_1$ :



“should the relative time variants generate an error unless preceded by a CTO object in the same message?”

# Language Poison

- Range: (start,stop)
  - If we can't get this right...
- Better: (start,count), ala Modbus & IEC 104
- Would *ideally* like to avoid counts in the first place  
=> Context-free!

# Implementation Goals / Principles

- Be as grammatical as possible
  - Want to look like CFG, though we can't be
- Avoid code duplication (much abstraction)
- Capture DNP3's "true" syntax
  - Reject at syntax level what others may do later

# Parser Combinators: look like grammars


Have primitives

```
HParser *seqno = h_bits(4, false);  
HParser *bit   = h_bits(1, false);  
...
```

Combined to form higher-level structures

```
h_choice, h_many, h_many1, ...  
define own combinators
```

# Example – Fragment Header Flags




```
/* --- uns,con,fin,fir --- */
conflags = h_sequence(bit,zro,one,one, NULL); // CONFIRM
reqflags = h_sequence(zro,zro,one,one, NULL); // always fin,fir!
unsflags = h_sequence(one,one,ign,ign, NULL); // unsolicited
rspflags = h_sequence(zro,bit,bit,bit, NULL);
```

# Example - CROB Object

```

crob = h_sequence(h_bits(4, false), // op type
                bit, // queue flag
                bit, // clear flag
                tcc,
                h_uint8(), // count
                h_uint32(), // on-time [ms]
                h_uint32(), // off-time [ms]
                status, // 7 bits
                dnp3_p_reserved(1),
                NULL);

```



# Example – SELECT Function

```
pcb          = dnp3_p_g12v2_binoutcmd_pcb_oblock;  
pcm          = dnp3_p_g12v3_binoutcmd_pcm_oblock;  
select_pcb   = h_sequence(pcb, h_many1(pcm), NULL);  
select_oblock = h_choice(select_pcb,  
                          dnp3_p_g12v1_binoutcmd_crob_oblock,  
                          dnp3_p_anaout_oblock,  
                          NULL);  
  
select       = h_many(select_oblock;
```


// empty select requests valid?

// is it valid to have many pcb-pcm blocks in the same request?

// ... to mix pcbs and crobs?

// langsec approach warns you of pitfalls!

# Practical application: Validating Proxy



# Pretty printing of AST in log

```
user@ubuntu: ~/dev/dnp3/build
c - send crob
ms(1449173437972) INFO      tcpclient - Begining task: Command Task
ms(1449173437972) --AL->  tcpclient - CD 03 0C 01 28 01 00 00 00 03 01 64 00 00 00 64 00 00
ms(1449173437972) --AL->  tcpclient - 00 00
ms(1449173437972) --AL->  tcpclient - FIR: 1 FIN: 1 CON: 0 UNS: 0 SEQ: 13 FUNC: SELECT
ms(1449173437972) --AL->  tcpclient - 012,001 Binary Command - CROB, 16-bit count and prefix [1]
ms(1449173437973) <-AL-- tcpclient - FIR: 1 FIN: 1 CON: 0 UNS: 0 SEQ: 13 FUNC: RESPONSE IIN: [0x00, 0x00]
ms(1449173437973) <-AL-- tcpclient - 012,001 Binary Command - CROB, 16-bit count and prefix [1]
ms(1449173437973) --AL->  tcpclient - CE 04 0C 01 28 01 00 00 00 03 01 64 00 00 00 64 00 00
ms(1449173437973) --AL->  tcpclient - 00 00
ms(1449173437973) --AL->  tcpclient - FIR: 1 FIN: 1 CON: 0 UNS: 0 SEQ: 14 FUNC: OPERATE
ms(1449173437973) --AL->  tcpclient - 012,001 Binary Command - CROB, 16-bit count and prefix [1]
ms(1449173437975) <-AL-- tcpclient - FIR: 1 FIN: 1 CON: 0 UNS: 0 SEQ: 14 FUNC: RESPONSE IIN: [0x00, 0x00]
ms(1449173437975) <-AL-- tcpclient - 012,001 Binary Command - CROB, 16-bit count and prefix [1]
```

```
2015-12-03 12:10:37,973 INFO [default] <-s- [13] (fir,fin) SELECT {g12v1 qc=28 #0:(LATCH_ON 1x on=100ms off=100ms)}
2015-12-03 12:10:37,973 INFO [default] -c-> primary frame from outstation 10 to 1: UNCONFIRMED_USER_DATA: C8 CD 81 00 00 0C 01 28 01 00
2015-12-03 12:10:37,973 INFO [default] -c-> [13] (fir,fin) RESPONSE {g12v1 qc=28 #0:(LATCH_ON 1x on=100ms off=100ms)}
2015-12-03 12:10:37,974 INFO [default] <-s- primary frame from master 1 to 10: UNCONFIRMED_USER_DATA: FE CE 04 0C 01 28 01 00 00 00 03
2015-12-03 12:10:37,974 INFO [default] <-s- [14] (fir,fin) OPERATE {g12v1 qc=28 #0:(LATCH_ON 1x on=100ms off=100ms)}
2015-12-03 12:10:37,974 INFO [default] -c-> primary frame from outstation 10 to 1: UNCONFIRMED_USER_DATA: C9 CE 81 00 00 0C 01 28 01 00
2015-12-03 12:10:37,974 INFO [default] -c-> [14] (fir,fin) RESPONSE {g12v1 qc=28 #0:(LATCH_ON 1x on=100ms off=100ms)}
```

# Validation: familiar tools/techniques

- Unit tests, Unit tests, Unit tests
- Tests based on common DNP3 implementation mistakes
- Dynamic analysis with Valgrind
- Fuzzing: coverage-guided (AFL) and model-based (Aegis)
- No static analysis, but multiple compilers including Clang

# No silver bullet, but correct tactic

- Langsec approach doesn't guarantee success, but provides a **disciplined roadmap** for success
- Traditional testing techniques are just as important, but Langsec gives them more order (when to test what? What to test for? Factor your code so that it's testable—parser before processing)
- Well-factored parsers will be more maintainable and extensible

# Write tests as you write production code.

// mixing CROBs, analog output, and PCBs

```
check_parse(dnp3_p_app_request,  
            "\xC3\x03\x0C  
\x02\x07\x01\x41\x03\xF4\x01\x00\x00\xD0\x07\x00\x00\x0  
\x03\x00\x05\x0F\x21\x04"  
            "\x29\x01\x17\x01\x01\x12\x34\x56\x78\x00", 34,  
  
            "[3] (fir,fin) SELECT {g12v2 qc=07 (CLOSE PULSE_ON 3x on=500ms off=2000ms)}"  
            "{g12v3 qc=00 #5..15: 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1}"  
            "{g41v1 qc=17 #1:2018915346}");
```


<a href="#">src</a>		<b>90.4 %</b>	1107 / 1225	<b>91.5 %</b>	119 / 130
<a href="#">src/obj</a>		<b>100.0 %</b>	465 / 465	<b>100.0 %</b>	45 / 45

# Unit tests for known poison

```
// 4-byte max range - start = 0, stop = 0xFFFFFFFF
```

```
check_parse(dnp3_p_app_response,  
            "\x00\x81\x00\x00\x1E\x02\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF", 15,  
            "PARAM_ERROR on [0] RESPONSE");
```

```
static HParsedToken *act_range(const HParseResult *p, void *user)  
{  
    // p->ast = (start, stop)  
    uint32_t start = H_FIELD_UINT(0);  
    uint32_t stop = H_FIELD_UINT(1);  
  
    assert(start <= stop);  
    assert(stop - start < SIZE_MAX);  
    return H_MAKE_UINT(stop - start + 1);  
}
```




# American fuzzy lop (AFL)

- Generic coverage-guided fuzzing
- Program must accept input from stdin


```
american fuzzy lop 1.83b (dnp3-app-afl)

process timing
  run time : 0 days, 16 hrs, 9 min, 42 sec
  last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 46 sec
  last uniq crash : none seen yet
  last uniq hang : 0 days, 0 hrs, 11 min, 26 sec
cycle progress
  now processing : 1098 (99.55%)
  paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)
stage progress
  now trying : havoc
  stage execs : 43.6k/120k (36.33%)
  total execs : 35.3M
  exec speed : 835.3/sec
fuzzing strategy yields
  bit flips : 117/440k, 10/439k, 10/437k
  byte flips : 0/55.0k, 0/40.3k, 1/39.1k
  arithmetics : 73/2.29M, 0/1.87M, 0/228k
  known ints : 1/172k, 7/950k, 8/1.65M
  dictionary : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0
               havoc : 859/26.6M, 0/0
               trim : 5.03%/21.7k, 24.51%
overall results
  cycles done : 7
  total paths : 1103
  uniq crashes : 0
  uniq hangs : 135
map coverage
  map density : 1356 (2.07%)
  count coverage : 4.02 bits/tuple
findings in depth
  favored paths : 192 (17.41%)
  new edges on : 257 (23.30%)
  total crashes : 0 (0 unique)
  total hangs : 11.1k (135 unique)
path geometry
  levels : 14
  pending : 357
  pend fav : 1
  own finds : 1101
  imported : n/a
  variable : 0

[cpu: 79%]
```



# Fuzzing in observe-only mode





# Some Lessons Learned

- DNP3 is obviously well-intentioned :)
  - Wants syntax to be simple
- Unfortunately ends up doing it wrong :(
  - "Uniform" syntax not so uniform
- Could almost be context-free
- Start/stop based index syntax is just plain dangerous.

# Discoveries

- Several design/clarification questions
  - correct to ignore FCB on secondary frames?
  - is there a minimum number of bytes in the transport payload?
  - ....
- Spec bugs/issues
  - AN2013-004b: RESPONSE can also include g120v1
  - should status bits be 8 on anaout, but 7 everywhere else?“
  - ....

# Future work

- Language subsetting, i.e. constraining grammar via configuration
- Structs -> output (aka un-parsing)
- Open questions WRT to protocol particularities
- Missing features in parser
  - g120 – authentication structures
  - g70 - File transfer
- Proxy that processes multiple sessions

# OS protections for well-separated parsers

- Parser is the most dangerous part of the program
  - Most memory corruptions and exploits occur here
- When properly separated, it can be isolated by OS means
- **ELFbac**: a Linux kernel-based memory isolation for code and data in ELF binary files sections
  - Enforces ACLs between code and data units
    - E.g.: only the parser reads raw input buffers
  - Compatible with Grsecurity/PaX patches
  - Exists for x86 and ARM (public release this January)
- Works for our DNP3 proxy!

# Fin - Questions?

<https://github.com/pesco/dnp3>

<https://github.com/sergeybratus/proxy>

open source, BSD license

3<sup>rd</sup> LangSec IEEE S&P workshop: <http://spw16.langsec.org/>



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