

Shotgun parsers in the cross-hairs


Sergey Bratus Meredith L. Patterson



Monday, October 1, 12


"Shotgun parser", the deadliest of patterns


 Input data checking, handling interspersed with processing logic




Dispatches from the Beagle

- Travel to the past
- Collect specimens of vulns
- Build a cladistics












"Darwin's Rootshell Finches"

- Complex software written by experts
- Subtle bugs that took a while to find & exploit
- Critical: remote code exec, pre-auth, core protocols/stacks
- Underlying data format complexity reason why bugs happened







- Recognizer handles input, enforces expectations of subsequent code, paranoid is good.
- Processing code gets the job done, less paranoid (but "might need more sanity checks").



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"Bringing the Wrong Weapon to a Fight"



Recognizer is your system's weapon against programming by crafted input ("weird machines")



- The Reddit Comment Bomb, 2009
- IE8 anti-XSS filters fiasco,
 Pwnie for Most Epic Fail 2010



"Tool-using Finch"

The Lulziest Myths of Input Handling (I)


- Input sanitization: "you can suppress 'bad stuff' in *input* to make it safe"
- Reality: Safety is a property of your input as a *language*. Only recognition assures it.



The Lulziest Myths of Input Handling (II)

• **Escaping** is "just string replacement"

 Reality: Proper escaping is a language property. Only recognition assures it.



Reddit Comment Bomb

---"Reddit weird machine"

- "to prevent double escaping of certain chars, they are run through MD5 after being escaped once, then MD5 is undone at the end"
- "markdown allowed specifying a variable for inflating later on"
- Create a comment with JS on onmouseover injecting MD5 => automatically post comments on user's behalf



http://blog.reddit.com/2009/09/we-had-some-bugs-and-it-hurt-us.html

The Lulziest Myths of Input Handling (III)

- Input sanitization: "you can suppress 'bad stuff' in *input+output* to make it safe"
- Reality: Halting problem. Deal with it.



IE8 Anti-XSS Epic Fail

 IE8 deploys RegExp rewriting of server responses to suppress XSS



<OB{J}ECT[/+\t].*?((type)|(codetype)|(classid)| (code)|(data))[/+\t]*=

```
<LI{N}K[ /+\t].*?href[ /+\t]*=
```

- <[i]?f{r}ame.*?[/+\t]*?src[/+\t]*=
- Renders "safe" sites vulnerable: "Abusing IE8s XSS Filters", Vela Nava & Lindsay, <u>http://p42.us/ie8xss/</u>
- Google saves:

X-XSS-Protection: 0


"Have substitution, will compute"



- Substitution is computation, too,
 especially when some component will do it
 repeatedly for you
- Best ex.: Mario Heiderich's "Got your Nose": no-JS CCS-only HTML password recovery
 - password manager brings the loop
 - SVG elements bring the "if"
 - suddenly, it's a party in your browser

"RootShell Finches"

- BIND 8.2 NXT record remote buffer overflow, by ADM [horizon/plaguez], 1999
- OpenSSH 3.3 Pre-auth challenge-response, by GOBBLES, 2002
- OpenBSD 4.0 remote IPv6 mbuff overflow, by Core [ortega, gera], 2007



Your data format is a language. Treat it as such.


- Make elements validatable on their own.
- Avoid having to validate complex relationships between multiple elements ("context sensitivity") in input data
- The more context you need, the more the devil has you.

BIND 8.2 ADM-NXT remote buffer overflow


1999

- Representing a definite negative is hard
- NXT: Signable DNS record type containing the interval containing a non-existent name: a.foo.com. NXT c.foo.com.
- Added in RFC 2065, updated by RFC 2535

NXT query scheme



Recap: DNS & its RRs



"When you have a shotgun parser, Mr. Length Field is no longer your friend"

DNS Resource Record (RR)

NAME	sequence of labels variable length
TYPE	integer, 16 bits
CLASS	integer, 16 bits
TTL	integer, 32 bits
RDLENGTH	unsigned integer, 16 bits
RDATA	string of octets, variable length

"Context sensitive is not a safe place to be"

- Domain name is compressed
- Can only be checked after expanded with offsets to substrings in preceding packet
- The expanded length must be consistent/expected by the result buffer


"..." "Oh where did we go wrong

```
1. case T NXT:
 2.
       n = dn_expand(msg, eom, cp, (char *)data, sizeof data);
 3.
        if (n < 0) {
 4.
           hp->rcode = FORMERR;
 5.
           return (-1);
 6.
        }
7.
        if (!ns nameok((char *)data, class, NULL, response trans,
 8.
                domain ctx, dname, from.sin addr)) {
 9.
            hp->rcode = FORMERR;
10.
            return (-1);
11.
        }
12.
        cp += n;
        cpl = data + strlen((char *)data) + 1;
13.
14.
       memcpy(cpl, cp, dlen - n);
15.
16.
     cp += (dlen - n);
17.
       cpl += (dlen - n);
18.
19.
        /* compute size of data */
20.
        n = cpl - (u_char *)data;
21.
        cpl = (u char *)data;
22.
        break;
```

Beware of context-sensitive data formats

- Elements that must add up across a span of data are danger
- "I'll go parsing until the packet makes sense, then discard the allocs" is danger
- The more context you need, the more the devil has you.


OpenSSH 3.3 Pre-Auth remote buffer overflow



2002

- "Heap-based overflow resulting from an integer overflow"
- Reasonable-looking byte-buffer parser
 -- but something went awry

"Just us shotgun bytes here"



The syntax-semantics boundary is a boundary of competence

- "Special cases" in code are either features of the input data language


 -- and must be treated as such - or are violations of syntax-semantics
 boundary, and should be avoided
- "Code smells" may signal problems with data design, or worse.

OpenBSD 4.0 remote kernel mbuf overflow


• Found by Core's ortega, gera Apr '07

2007

- Kernel remote exploitable IPv6 buffer overflow via ICMPv6 fragmentation
- Interacts complexly with *mbuf* packet buffer allocation scheme of OpenBSD




Chaining headers by NH type





mbuf



What happens with mbufs

- Packets are stored in chains of mbufs
- Headers get parsed & turned into memory representation one at a time
- mbufs get copied and changed in place, depending on previous mbufs in the chain
- Very context-sensitive

Ensuring mbuf bytes are contiguous in memory

```
/*
 * ensure that [off, off + len) is contiguous on the mbuf chain "m".
 * packet chain before "off" is kept untouched.
 * if offp == NULL, the target will start at <retval, 0> on resulting chain.
 * if offp != NULL, the target will start at <retval, *offp> on resulting chain.
 *
 * on error return (NULL return value), original "m" will be freed.
 *
 * XXX M_TRAILINGSPACE/M_LEADINGSPACE on shared cluster (sharedcluster)
 */
struct mbuf *
m_pulldown(struct mbuf *m, int off, int len, int *offp)
{
        struct mbuf *n, *o;
        int hlen, tlen, olen;
        int sharedcluster:
        /* check invalid arguments. */
        if (m == NULL)
                panic("m == NULL in m_pulldown()");
        if (len > MCLBYTES) {
                m_freem(m);
                return (NULL); /* impossible */
        }
```

```
/*
* when len <= n->m_len - off and off != 0, it is a special case.
* len bytes from <n, off> sits in single mbuf, but the caller does
 * not like the starting position (off).
 * chop the current mbuf into two pieces, set off to 0.
*/
if (len <= n \rightarrow m_len – off) {
        struct mbuf *mlast;
        o = m_dup1(n, off, n->m_len - off, M_DONTWAIT);
        if (o == NULL) {
                m_freem(m);
                return (NULL); /* ENOBUFS */
        }
static struct mbuf *
m_dup1(struct mbuf *m, int off, int len, int wait)
{
        struct mbuf *n;
        int l:
        int copyhdr;
        if (len > MCLBYTES)
                return (NULL);
        if (off == 0 && (m->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) != 0) {
                copyhdr = 1;
                MGETHDR(n, wait, m->m_type);
                l = MHLEN; /* SB: 256 - m_hdr - pkthdr */
```

m_copydata(m, off, len, mtod(n, caddr_t));

```
void
ip6_input(m)
    struct mbuf *m;
{
    struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
    int off = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), nest;
    u_int32_t plen;
    u_int32_t rtalert = ~0;
    int nxt, ours = 0;
    struct ifnet *deliverifp = NULL;
```

What does this code smell like?

/* 451 lines omitted */

```
/*
 * protection against faulty packet - there should be
 * more sanity checks in header chain processing.
 */
 if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off) {
    ip6stat.ip6s_tooshort++;
    in6_ifstat_inc(m->m_pkthdr.rcvif, ifs6_in_truncated);
    goto bad;
 }
 nxt = (*inet6sw[ip6_protox[nxt]].pr_input)(&m, &off, nxt);
 }
return;
bad:
 m_freem(m);
```

3

What does this code smell like?



Printed on fan-fold paper, no function should be longer than you are tall!

- Code smells are hints, not certainties
- Pragmatism dictates: look deeper.

This is often a symptom of violating the **OneResponsibilityRule**.



From <u>BertrandMeyer</u>'s <u>ObjectOrientedSoftwareConstruction</u>, there was the statement (quoting from memory):

A class has a single responsibility: it does it all, does it well, and does it only.

When a function has too many responsibilities, it becomes buried deep in SpecialFormatting, which has a CodeSmell.

To avoid bloat and confusion, and ensure that code is truly simple (not just quick to hack out) we have to practice <u>CodeNormalization</u>, which seems to be a variation on <u>OnceAndOnlyOnce</u> and also <u>DoTheSimplestThingThatCouldPossiblyWork</u>.

What were they trying to do?



Keep all of the operations in a method at the same level of abstraction.

- You'd think one layer of the network stack would be one layer of abstraction
- But its syntax and semantics are different layers



Design has been about code patterns; it should also be about data patterns

• What do we mean when we say "offset"?

What We Talk About When We Talk About Offsets

- Packet offsets
 - Where in the packet does data start?
- Buffer offsets
 - Where in the buffer does an item start?
- I packet == I buffer == same value
 - otherwise, not necessarily!

How did they fix it?

```
@@ -226,16 +226,16 @@ m_dup1(struct mbuf *m, int off, int len,
{
        struct mbuf *n;
        int l;
        int copyhdr;
        if (len > MCLBYTES)
                return (NULL);
        if (off == 0 && (m->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) != 0) {
                copyhdr = 1;
                MGETHDR(n, wait, m->m_type);
                if (n == NULL)
+
                         return (NULL);
+
                M_DUP_PKTHDR(n, m);
+
                l = MHLEN;
        } else {
                copyhdr = 0;
                MGET(n, wait, m->m_type);
                l = MLEN;
        }
@@ -249,8 +249,6 @@ m_dup1(struct mbuf *m, int off, int len,
        if (!n)
                return (NULL);
        if (copyhdr)
                M_DUP_PKTHDR(n, m);
        m_copydata(m, off, len, mtod(n, caddr_t));
        n->m_len = len;
```

What does this code smell like?



Consists of code where nested if statements generate an arrow shape, like so:

```
if
if
if
do something
endif
endif
endif
endif
```

Stinky.

```
-226,16 +226,16 @@ m_dup1(struct mbuf *m, int off, int len,
00
{
        struct mbuf *n;
        int l;
        int copyhdr;
        if (len > MCLBYTES)
                return (NULL):
        if (off == 0 && (m->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) != 0) {
                copyhdr = 1;
                MGETHDR(n, wait, m->m_type);
                if (n == NULL)
                         return (NULL);
                M_DUP_PKTHDR(n, m);
                l = MHLEN;
        } else {
                copyhdr = 0;
                MGET(n, wait, m->m_type);
                l = MLEN;
        }
@@ -249,8 +249,6 @@ m_dup1(struct mbuf *m, int off, int len,
        if (!n)
                return (NULL);
        if (copyhdr)
                M_DUP_PKTHDR(n, m);
        m_copydata(m, off, len, mtod(n, caddr_t));
        n->m_len = len;
```



Take-away



- Your data format is a language. Treat it as such.
- Beware of context-sensitive data formats
- Design has been about code patterns; it should be also about data patterns - actually, data languages



"The syntax-semantics boundary is a boundary of competence." Protect it with correct recognizers.

